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1 Introduction
Standard economic theory assumes that states can tax at will and commit funds to a
broad set of military and civilian goods. However, effective states are only a recent his-
torical development.1 Effective states, furthermore, represent just a fraction of modern
nations. Like their historical predecessors, today’s developing states often confront prob-
lems of low revenues and unproductive expenditures.2 To explain why some countries
achieve long-run economic growth but others do not, a clear understanding of state ca-
pacity is therefore critical.
An early, case-based literature in political science highlights the role of state capacity
in development, and state capacity has now become a key concern of economists.3 A
recent major work by Besley and Persson (2011) defines state capacity in terms of two
complementary capabilities that enable the state to act. The first concerns the state’s ex-
tractive role as a tax collector and the second its productive role as a provider of public
services (e.g., transportation networks, courts). Besley and Persson argue that state ca-
pacity – the combined extractive and productive capabilities of the state – forms a critical
part of development clusters that vary closely with income levels.
The main task of the new economics literature has been to expand standard theory
to incorporate state capacity issues. However, there are still relatively few quantitatively
rigorous empirical works, whether in economics or political science, about the long-term
links between state capacity and economic performance. To address this important gap,
this paper examines the economic impacts of fundamental political transformations that
resolved long-standing state capacity problems in Europe, the birthplace of modern eco-
nomic growth.
We argue that sovereign governments in European history faced two basic political
problems: fiscal fragmentation and absolutism. Although rulers had weak authority
over taxation, they had strong control over expenditures. Under this equilibrium, rev-
enues were low and executives typically spent available funds on military adventures
rather than on public services with broad economic benefits.
1See Hintze (1906), Tilly (1975, 1990), Mathias and O’Brien (1976), Levi (1988), Brewer (1989), Hoffman
and Rosenthal (1997), Epstein (2000), O’Brien (2001, 2011), Dincecco (2011), Karaman and Pamuk (2011), and
Rosenthal and Wong (2011).
2 For state capacity problems in sub-saharan Africa, see Migdal (1988), Herbst (2000), and Bates (2001). By
contrast, states have played key roles in the successful development experiences of Asian Tiger nations. See
Wade (1990) and Kang (2002).
3For political science works, see Footnote 2. For economics, see Acemoglu et al. (2004), Acemoglu (2005),
Acemoglu et al. (2011), Besley and Persson (2011), McBride et al. (2011), and Gennaioli and Voth (2012).
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The political transformations that we study fit squarely within Besley and Persson’s
(2011) conceptual framework of economic development. We argue that the implementa-
tion of uniform tax systems at the national level – which we call “fiscal centralization”
– enabled European states to effectively fulfill their extractive role. This transformation
typically occurred swiftly and permanently from 1789 onward. Similarly, we argue that
the establishment of parliaments that could monitor public expenditures at regular inter-
vals – called “limited government” – enabled them to effectively fulfill their productive
role. This transformation typically occurred decades after fiscal centralization over the
nineteenth century. By the mid-1800s, most European states had achieved “modern” ex-
tractive and productive capabilities, implying that they could gather large tax revenues
and effectively channel funds toward non-military public services.
We argue that these critical improvements in state capacity had strongly positive per-
formance impacts. To rigorously develop our claim, we perform a panel regression anal-
ysis on a novel database that spans eleven countries from the height of the Old Regime in
1650 to the eve of World War I in 1913. Our main specification uses a standard difference-
in-differences approach. We first model the extractive and productive capabilities of
states as a function of political regime type, country fixed effects that account for un-
observed time-invariant, country-level heterogeneity, time fixed effects that account for
common shocks, time-varying controls including external and internal conflicts and state
antiquity, and country-specific time trends. We then model economic performance as a
function of state capacity. For robustness, we also use two alternative specifications to
difference-in-differences. The first includes a lagged dependent variable to account for
persistence in fiscal and economic outcomes. The second uses a GMM approach, en-
abling us to account for simultaneity and omitted variable bias alike. We discuss poten-
tial threats to inference at length in Section 5.
The results of our analysis indicate that the impacts of political transformations on
state extractive and productive capabilities, and in turn the impacts of state capacity on
economic performance, are large, statistically significant, and robust. First, we find that
political transformations increased per capita revenues by roughly 20 to 50 percent over
the subsequent five-year period, and increased per capita non-military expenditures by
roughly 20 to 80 percent. Furthermore, the results of placebo tests, for which we recode
political transformations as if they had taken place decades prior to the actual years,
indicate that transformations were associated with abrupt state capacity improvements
that were not already underway. Second, we find that state capacity improvements in
turn had significant positive performance impacts. Our estimates indicate that a 1 per-
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cent increase in per capita revenues led to a 0.384 to 0.833 percentage point increase in
the subsequent five-year growth rate of per capita GDP. Similarly, a 1 percent increase
in per capita non-military expenditures led to a 1.261 to 3.272 percentage point increase
in the subsequent GDP growth rate. Given that average growth rates ranged from 3
to 5 percent over our sample period, the magnitudes of these performance impacts are
substantial.
Our paper is related to the literature that examines the links between historical insti-
tutional factors and long-run economic performance, including Engerman and Sokoloff
(1997), La Porta et al. (1998), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2005a),
Banerjee and Iyer (2005), and Nunn (2008). None of these works, however, focus on
state capacity.4 Furthermore, this literature does not typically identify just how history
matters (Nunn, 2009).5 Our paper tests a specific mechanism – namely, the impacts of
effective revenue extraction and spending – through which state capacity improvements
have long-term economic impacts. Overall, our macro-oriented approach complements
microeconomic research that uses randomized controlled experiments to test whether
specific policy interventions are effective (Duflo et al., 2007).
Our paper is also related to the literature that argues that the state was an active
participant in the development of modern capitalist systems, including Gerschenkron
(1966), Magnusson (2009), and O’Brien (2011). We provide a data-intensive, rigorous
counterpart to these works. Our paper thus contributes to the debate regarding the in-
stitutional origins of the Industrial Revolution (Acemoglu et al., 2005b, Mokyr, 2008).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the historical back-
ground and Section 3 develops our theoretical implications. Section 4 presents the data
and descriptive statistics, a case study of France, a core sample country, and structural
breaks tests. Section 5 discusses the econometric methodology. Section 6 reports the
results of our estimations for the impacts of political regimes on state capacity, includ-
ing the placebo tests. Section 7 reports the results for the impacts of state capacity on
economic performance. Section 8 concludes.
4One exception is Bockstette et al. (2002), which investigates the economic impacts of early statehood. They
find a strong positive link between state antiquity and current development. Similarly, Dincecco and Prado
(2012) find a strong positive relationship between fiscal capacity and performance. They use historical war
casualties to instrument for current fiscal institutions.
5A recent exception is Dell (2010), which argues that public goods provision by large landowners in Peru-
vian history has persistent development effects.
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2 Historical Background
This section characterizes the two fundamental political transformations that resolved
key state capacity problems in European history. We argue that fiscal centralization al-
lowed states to effectively fulfill their extractive role and limited government their pro-
ductive one.6
2.1 Fiscal Centralization
Most polities in Europe were fiscally fragmented before the nineteenth century. Contrary
to conventional wisdom, monarchs confronted a host of incumbent local institutions that
reduced their fiscal powers. Epstein (2000, pp. 13-14) writes that
decades of research on pre-modern political practices. . . has shown how “ab-
solutism” was a largely propagandistic device devoid of much practical sub-
stance. . . The strength of a monarch’s theoretical claims to absolute rule was
frequently inversely proportional to his de facto powers.
One general feature of fragmented states was the close relationship between local tax
control and political autonomy. Provincial elites thus had strong incentives to oppose
fiscal reforms that threatened traditional tax rights. The result was a classic public goods
problem. Since each local authority attempted to free-ride on the tax contributions of
others, the revenues that national governments could extract per capita were low.
To resolve the problem of local tax free-riding, executives had to gain the fiscal au-
thority to impose standard tax menus rather than bargain place by place over individual
rates. So long as states equalized rates across provinces at relatively high levels, govern-
ment revenues per head rose.
A clear and simple definition of fiscal centralization facilitates comparison across
states. We define that the centralization process was completed the year that the national
government first secured its revenues through a standard tax system with uniform rates
throughout the country.7
All pre-centralized regimes were classified as entirely fragmented, even for states
where fiscal divisions were relatively small. This choice implies that some regimes that
6Our account follows Dincecco (2011, chs. 2-3), who also provides sources.
7This definition does not imply that central governments became tax monopolists. The history of the United
States just after the Revolution of 1776 illustrates this point. Under the Articles of Confederation, the first
U.S. constitution, Congress could only request tax funds from states. Fiscal centralization took place in 1788,
when the new constitution granted Congress the legal power to ensure that states complied with national tax
standards. However, U.S. states could still levy local taxes.
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were counted as fully fragmented will encompass data associated with higher per capita
revenues. Average improvements after fiscal centralization will therefore be smaller than
otherwise. Systematic underestimation of the fiscal impacts of centralization biases the
data against the hypothesis that fiscal centralization increased revenues. The results of
our analysis will thus be stronger than otherwise if they still indicate that fiscally central-
ized regimes had significant positive fiscal impacts.
Table 1 displays the dates of fiscal centralization across sample countries. The Nor-
man Conquest of 1066 undercut provincial authority in England and established a uni-
formity of laws and customs that other states did not achieve until much later.8 Struc-
tural changes took place swiftly and permanently in many parts of continental Europe
after the tumultuous fall of the Old Regime. The National Assembly transformed the
tax system in France by eliminating traditional privileges at the start of the Revolution
(1789-99). Napoleon completed this process after taking power in 1799. The First French
Republic conquered the Low Countries in 1795, and the Southern Netherlands including
Belgium became French departments. The Batavian Republic, the successor to the Dutch
Republic, established a national system of taxation under French rule in 1806. French
conquest at the start of the 1800s was also the major catalyst for fiscal change on the
Italian peninsula. France annexed Piedmont in 1802. Finally, Prussia undertook major
administrative reforms including fiscal centralization after its loss to France in the Battle
of Jena-Auerstedt in 1806.
Although Napoleon defeated Austria in 1805 and invaded Portugal in 1807 and Spain
in 1808, he implemented incomplete administrative changes in those territories. Fiscal
centralization did not take place in the Austrian Empire until after the 1848 revolutions,
which had important implications for bureaucratic structures. Most notably, the central
government in Vienna began to implement an effective Cisleithanian tax system in Hun-
gary.9 Fiscal centralization also occurred in the 1840s in Spain during a period of major
reforms. Significant fiscal change in Portugal took place in the 1850s. The 1859 reform
led to the centralization and regulation of government accounts.
8England conjoined with Wales in 1536. The Act of Union of 1707 conjoined Scotland. A similar Act con-
joined Ireland in 1800 (the Irish Free State was established in 1922). For consistency, the term ”England” rather
than “Great Britain” or the “United Kingdom” is used throughout the text. However, we must distinguish be-
tween medieval English fiscal and political institutions and British ones. Brewer (1989, pp. 5-6) writes: “There
was certainly an English medieval state, made from a Norman template, but not a British one. . . Nevertheless
the English core of what was eventually to become the British state was both geographically larger and better
administrated than its French equivalent.”
9Austria and Hungary were the largest territories of the Austrian Empire (1804-67). The Compromise of
1867 led to the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867-1918). For consistency, the term “Austria”
is used throughout the text.
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Pre-modern fiscal structures remained in Scandinavia through much of the 1800s.
Major changes did not occur until the second half of the nineteenth century or later.
The 1861 reform in Sweden abolished the traditional system of dividing tax subjects into
different classes with many sub-groups and rules for fixed contributions. Similarly, the
1903 reform in Denmark eliminated traditional tax structures and introduced a modern
income tax with standard, country-wide rates.
2.2 Limited Government
Although rulers spent government funds as they pleased, elites in national parliaments
exercised tax authority. Hoffman and Rosenthal (1997) argue that the one true goal of
absolutist monarchs was to wage war for personal glory and for homeland defense. A
key reason was the problem of royal moral hazard in warfare (Cox, 2011). In Hoffman’s
(2009, p. 24) words, monarchs
overspent on the military and provided more defense than their citizens likely
desired. But they had little reason not to. Victory. . . won them glory, enhanced
reputations, and resources. . . Losses never cost them their throne.
Since parliamentary elites feared that executives would spend additional revenues in
wasteful ways like foreign military adventures, they demanded the power of budgetary
oversight before raising new taxes. To evade parliament, rulers resorted to fiscal preda-
tion, which reinforced the fear that they could not be trusted. Parliamentary elites thus
resisted tax requests and revenues were low.
Regular control over state budgets firmly established the fiscal supremacy of par-
liament. In turn, the likelihood of poor spending choices by executives fell. Although
structural reforms implied that rulers would receive greater revenues, the surrender of
budgetary control was the only credible way for executives to guarantee that a portion of
the new funds would be used on non-military public services that parliamentary elites
desired.
Even if rulers and elites each had incentives to set new rules over government ex-
penditures, however, institutional reform was notoriously difficult. Limited government
was typically established at critical junctures that came at the confluence of idiosyncratic
shocks. For pre-1789 France, for instance, Hoffman and Rosenthal (1997, pp. 33-4) write:
Although complaints against the legal system were widespread on the eve
of the French Revolution, reform proved politically impossible. . . The crown
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had stitched the kingdom together by according judicial privileges to power-
ful interest groups. Abolishing their privileges, even for the sake of judicial
rationality, was out of the question. . . It is no surprise then that legal reform
required a bloody revolution.
The next subsection further examines the role of critical junctures and institutional change.
A valid depiction of parliamentary authority must capture its real power to act on the
budget. It must also be clear and simple enough to apply across states. The substance
of our definition derives from the classic work of North and Weingast (1989). We de-
fine that limited government was established the year that parliament gained the stable
constitutional right to control the national budget on an annual basis. The requirement
that parliament’s power of the purse held for at least two consecutive decades ensures
stability. To make the coding as objective as possible, years and regimes for which there
are widespread academic consensus were chosen. There is a close correspondence be-
tween our coding scheme and the schemes of De Long and Shleifer (1993), Acemoglu et
al. (2005a), and the Polity IV Database of Jaggers and Marshall (2008), though none of
these schemes fit the particular demands of our analysis.10 In total, these three features
- a regular right by parliament to manage budgets, regime stability, and scholarly agree-
ment - imply that our coding of limited government parallels the standard that North
and Weingast introduced.
Selecting early dates to define political regimes as limited implies that average out-
comes under parliamentary regimes will be worse than otherwise. For instance, one can
argue that a stable form of limited government did not truly emerge in Germany until af-
ter World War II (the Weimar Republic endured for only 14 years, from 1918 to 1933) or in
Spain until after the death of Franco in 1975. If this were the case, then the correct coding
would be to categorize the pre-twentieth-century Prussian and Spanish regimes as ab-
solutist. Similar arguments can be made for Italy and Portugal. Since public finances in
Europe typically improved over time, the choice of early dates means that some regimes
classified as limited will encompass data associated with lower per capita non-military
spending. Average improvements after parliamentary reforms will therefore be smaller
than otherwise. Systematic underestimation of the fiscal impacts of limited government
10De Long and Shleifer (1993) use three measures: a binary indicator of absolutist versus non-absolutist
regimes, an eight-point constitutional scale, and the categories of capital versus coercion from Tilly (1990).
However, they code political regimes at 150-year intervals. Acemoglu et al. (2005a) use two measures: cat-
egories of executive constraints and protection for capital, both from the Polity IV Database. However, they
code political regimes at 50- or 100-year internals. Though Marshall and Jaggers (2008) classify executive con-
straints at yearly intervals, their database does not start until the 1800s.
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biases the data against the hypothesis that parliamentary reforms increased non-military
spending. Any results of our analysis that still indicate that limited government had
significant positive impacts on spending habits will thus be stronger than otherwise.
Furthermore, the establishment of limited government was not necessarily irreversible.
There were some instances of switching back and forth with absolutism over the 1800s.
As described, our definition sets a stability threshold by requiring that parliamentary
budgetary authority held for at least two straight decades.
Nineteenth-century France illustrates our coding methodology. The Bourbon monar-
chy was restored after the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815. This regime was constitu-
tional in name alone. In 1830, King Charles X dissolved parliament, manipulated the
electorate in favor of his supporters, placed the press under government control, and
called for new elections. These measures incited the July Revolution the next day. King
Louis Philip, the replacement for the deposed monarch, agreed to follow constitutional
principles, but his tenure was beset by the economic crisis of the mid-1840s and ended
with the Revolution of 1848. Since the reign of Louis Philip endured for less than two
decades, our benchmark scheme does not code the July regime as limited. However, the
case study in Section 4 accounts for its fiscal impacts. Napoleon III, who was elected
president of the Second Republic in 1848, staged a successful coup in 1851 and estab-
lished an authoritarian regime (called the Second Empire) that lasted nearly 20 years.
The emperor was captured during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1) and the provisional
government of the Third Republic was quickly formed. This regime was consolidated
in the aftermath of the conflict, which France lost, and endured for 70 years until the
German invasion of 1940. Since the Third Republic best satisfies the triple criteria of par-
liamentary regularity, stability, and scholarly consensus, our coding methodology dates
the emergence of limited government in France to 1870.
Table 2 displays the dates of limited government across sample countries. Parlia-
mentary reforms typically occurred decades after fiscal centralization over the nine-
teenth century. Belgium was established as a constitutional monarchy after revolting
and declaring independence from the Netherlands in 1830. In the Netherlands itself, a
new constitution that required the executive to submit annual budgets for parliamen-
tary approval was promulgated during the Year of Revolutions in 1848. Kings Charles
Albert of Piedmont and Frederick William IV of Prussia also granted liberal constitu-
tions in 1848.11 The Compromise of 1867, which established Austria and Hungary as
11Tilly (1966) argues that there were binding fiscal constraints in Prussia from 1848 onward, although the
government operated without legislative approval of its military budgets during the 1860s. Also see Ziblatt
(2006, pp. 113-16).
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distinct political entities, marked the start of the constitutional era in Austria following
the Austro-Prussian War (1866). Spain fought several civil wars over the 1800s. A stable
parliamentary regime was established in 1876 following the Third Carlist War (1872-6).
By contrast, limited government and fiscal centralization took place within a decade
of each other in Sweden and Portugal. Although Sweden enacted a constitution in 1809,
the executive retained absolute veto authority and parliament met only once every five
years. The parliamentary reform of 1866, which replaced the traditional Diet of Estates
with a modern bicameral legislature, established limited government. This institutional
change occurred five years after fiscal centralization in 1861. Like Spain, Portugal fought
a series of civil wars over the nineteenth century. A stable constitutional regime was
established in 1851, eight years before fiscal centralization in 1859.
There are two cases in which limited government was implemented well in advance
of fiscal centralization. In Denmark, King Frederick VII renounced his absolutist powers
and established a two-chamber parliament after the political revolutions of 1848. Fis-
cal centralization did not take place in Denmark until 1903. The Dutch Republic (1572-
1795) is typically classified as constitutional (De Long and Shleifer, 1993, Acemoglu et
al., 2005a, Stasavage, 2005). Recall, however, that the Republic was fiscally fragmented
at the national level.
2.3 Quasi-Random Variation
The historical evidence suggests that it is plausible to treat political transformations
as the result of quasi-random variation or shocks. As described, the establishment of
uniform tax systems was often the result of radical, externally imposed reform. In the
German territories, in the Low Countries, and on the Italian (and to a lesser extent, the
Iberian) peninsula, fiscal centralization was the result of French conquest from 1792 on-
ward. As O’Brien (2011a, p. 436) writes:
It seems that only the exogenous shocks of the kind delivered by. . . the out-
comes that flowed from the French Revolution (1789-1815) led to serious re-
forms to the fiscal constitutions of other ancien re´gimes on the mainland.
A similar logic holds for the establishment of centralized institutions in England follow-
ing the Norman Conquest in the eleventh century.
Elsewhere, fiscal centralization often took place in the midst of large-scale admin-
istrative reforms that established new state bureaucracies. Major institutional changes
typically occurred during times of political and social upheaval. The establishment of a
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uniform tax system in France itself during the Revolution (1789-99) illustrates the con-
flux of these factors, as does the case of Prussia during the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15),
Austria during the Year of Revolutions (1848), and Portugal and Spain near times of civil
wars.
A similar claim can be made for the establishment of limited government. Acemoglu
et al. (2008, 2009) argue that key historical junctures like the French Revolution or the
Revolutions of 1848 set countries on divergent political paths.12 Elster (2000, ch. 2) argues
that the establishment of many lasting modern constitutions was non-incremental and
came about in moments of crisis. Likewise, Russell (2004, p. 106) writes:
No liberal democratic state has accomplished comprehensive constitutional
change outside the context of some cataclysmic situation such as revolution,
world war, the withdrawal of empire, civil war, or the threat of imminent
breakup.13
A related point concerns the exact timing of institutional change. The evidence does
not suggest that European states undertook political transformations in direct response
to fiscal or economic conditions. Even if political transformations did occur due to pub-
lic finances or the economy, however, the exact timing of reform was typically unpre-
dictable.
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England illustrates this point. Upon the death
of Charles II in 1685, James II became king. Protestant elites were troubled by the fact
that James II was a devout Catholic with strong ties to France. The year 1688 was also
the start of the War of the Grand Alliance, fought between France and a European-wide
coalition including William III of Orange, who was crowned King of England alongside
Queen Mary in 1689 after James II was deposed.
One can argue that the coming together of particular events at a certain point in time –
or, in a nutshell, chance – brought about limited government in England in 1688 but not
before. Several previous attempts failed, including the 1685 rebellion led by the Duke
of Monmouth. By this logic, one can also make the case that constitutional reform in
England could have occurred on any number of occasions from 1640 to 1700, or not at
all. In the words of Pincus (2009, pp. 480-1):
12Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 4) make a general argument for the importance of critical junctures
and political change. Glaeser et al. (2004) claim that economic growth and human capital accumulation lead
to subsequent improvements in political institutions. Our econometric analysis controls for these factors.
13We thank Barry Weingast for alerting us to Elster’s work and Russell’s quotation.
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At various points in the later seventeenth century both later Stuart kings even
enjoyed widespread popular support. . . They were not pursuing ill-advised
strategies whose failure was preordained. . . It was not inevitable that James’s
Catholic modernization strategy would fail.
Similar arguments for historical contingency can be made for France in 1789, the Year of
Revolutions in 1848, and other critical junctures.
The historical evidence supports our claim that it is plausible to treat political trans-
formations as the result of quasi-random variation or shocks. For robustness, Sections 5
and 6 describe placebo tests for which we recode political transformations as if they had
taken place decades prior to the actual years. The test results indicate that political trans-
formations were associated with sudden and unexpected state capacity improvements.
Section 5 also discusses other threats to inference, including omitted variable bias.
3 Theoretical Implications
Table 3 describes the fiscal and economic features of different political regimes. We argue
that fiscally centralized and politically limited regimes enabled states to extract large
tax funds and then productively use them. Fiscal centralization increased the amount
of revenues that governments extracted per head by eliminating local tax free-riding.
Limited government made parliamentary elites more willing to submit to greater tax
burdens, because executives could make credible commitments to spend new funds on
non-military public services rather than on ill-advised wars. Hence, it also increased
revenues per capita.
Although higher tax revenues per head made it easier for executives to provide pub-
lic services under fiscally centralized regimes, the consolidation of fiscal powers may
have had an adverse fiscal impact through greater wasted spending. It is thus unclear
whether expenditures on non-military public services actually rose under centralized
versus fragmented regimes. However, by regularly monitoring the government’s bud-
get, and thereby reducing the likelihood of bad spending choices by executives, parlia-
mentary power of the purse should have increased non-military expenditures.
Under fragmented and absolutist regimes, tax revenues per head should have been
low and any available funds should have been unproductively used on foreign military
adventures. Economic performance should have been relatively poor as a result. Un-
der centralized and limited regimes, by contrast, per capita revenues should have been
high and funds should have been productively used on non-military public services. By
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solving both political problems, performance should have been relatively better. Un-
der fragmented and limited regimes, any available funds should have been productively
used, but revenues per head should have been low. Hence, performance should have
been higher than under fragmented and absolutist regimes but lower than under cen-
tralized and limited ones. Finally, under centralized and absolutist regimes, per capita
revenues should have been high, but funds would not necessarily have been produc-
tively used. Thus, performance under centralized and absolutist regimes should have
been lower than under centralized and limited ones. Depending on the ruler’s spending
decisions, however, it could have been higher than under other regime types.14
Schultz and Weingast (1998) claim that, in the context of the long-term international
rivalries that characterized pre-modern Europe, the ability of limited regimes to make
credible spending commitments was a critical military advantage over absolutist ones.
For instance, average total expenditures for parliamentary England in the war-intensive
century following the Glorious Revolution of 1688 were over 9 gold grams per capita,
more than double the average for absolutist France (Dincecco, 2011). We may think that
parliamentary power of the purse gave citizens confidence that military decisions and
investments were relatively sound.15
Once military dominance – and thus international peace – was truly established (i.e.,
the Pax Brittanica after 1815), we may think that parliamentary fiscal supremacy facil-
itated the switch toward the provision of non-military public services.16 Average per
capita non-military spending for England during the Pax Brittanica was over 12 gold
grams per head, roughly three times its average for the war-intensive eighteenth century
(Mitchell, 1988). Similarly, the average share of non-military spending in total expendi-
tures was nearly 40 percent higher.
At the same time, it is possible that the nature of post-1815 interstate political com-
petition reduced differences in spending habits between limited regimes and absolutist
ones. Nineteenth-century states came to view industrial strength as an important ba-
14Although a recent literature argues that higher taxation in today’s Europe helps account for the shortfall
in worker productivity relative to the U.S. (e.g., Prescott, 2004), our analysis does not reveal any negative
performance impacts of greater state capacity. When state capacity is already high (e.g., at today’s OECD-
country levels), however, there is reason to think that different tax compositions (e.g., income vs. consumption-
type taxes) may influence performance.
15Given England’s unique status as the first industrialized nation, state economic intervention may have
been of less overall importance (Gerschenkron, 1966). However, Magnusson (2009, ch. 4) and O’Brien (2011)
argue that the British government played a notable industrial role.
16O’Brien (2011) argues that the English state’s sheer fiscal and military might enabled it to play a productive
economic role (e.g., through the provision of secure trade routes). Gennaioli and Voth (2012), by contrast, sug-
gest that centralized and professional state administrations were key to economic efficiency (e.g., by facilitating
private contracting). Our econometric analysis accounts for these possibilities.
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sis for military prowess (Magnusson, 2009, Rosenthal and Wong, 2011). Major public
investments like transportation infrastructure served military as well as economic pur-
poses and were thought to have important consequences for the European balance of
power. Even authoritarian rulers had incentives to invest in non-military public services
(Rosenthal and Wong, 2011, ch. 6). Furthermore, the onset of industrialization gave rise
to new sources of social unrest, increasing the minimum amount of non-military public
services that authoritarians (e.g., Napoleon III) had to provide to sustain control (Ace-
moglu and Robinson, 2000). These factors imply that non-military spending differences
between limited regimes and absolutist ones were smaller than our theoretical predic-
tion would indicate. The results of our analysis will thus be stronger than otherwise if
they still indicate that limited government had significant positive impacts on spending
habits.
Finally, limited governments with broad voting franchises may pursue redistribu-
tive welfare programs that favor short-run consumption over public investments that
are conducive to long-run growth (Przeworski et al., 2000, ch. 3). This trade-off, how-
ever, was less problematic for the nascent parliamentary regimes of nineteenth-century
Europe. The franchise was typically highly restricted (Carstairs, 1980), reducing the po-
tential for large-scale redistributive schemes. Furthermore, central government welfare
spending (i.e., poor relief, unemployment compensation, health, and housing) was gen-
erally low (Lindert, 2004, ch. 2).
4 Data
The data on government revenues from 1650 to 1913 are from Dincecco (2011) and Dincecco
et al. (2011). Systematic data for non-military expenditures are not available before the
nineteenth century. These data, which we take from a variety of secondary sources, run
from 1816 to 1913. The Appendix describes the sources and construction methods for the
spending data.
For reasons of data availability, comparability, and reliability, we focus on taxing and
spending by national governments, rather than general taxing and spending that in-
cluded local and regional governments.17 All of our sample countries (except Prussia
after the establishment of the federal German Empire in 1871) had centralized political
17There was also the possibility of the private provision of “public” services like infrastructure (e.g., Bogart,
2005). However, it could be argued that even here the state’s indirect role as facilitator (e.g., courts) was
important.
14
structures during the sample period. Furthermore, national governments were typically
better able than local or regional ones to provide the types of non-military public ser-
vices (e.g., major transportation infrastructure projects) that interest us. Thus, the use of
national government data should not significantly bias our analysis.
Bonney (1995, pp. 423-506) and O’Brien (2011, pp. 408-20) discuss the limitations
of historical budgetary data. European states did not maintain detailed fiscal records
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. National governments may have cal-
culated yearly budgets in a variety of ways. Some states computed budgets with rev-
enues that they intended to extract, even if funds did not enter government coffers until
years later. Insofar as possible, we used tax receipts for national governments in a given
year. Ordinary and extraordinary figures were summed, and loan incomes were sub-
tracted.18 Since the different ways in which Old Regime governments tabulated yearly
revenues suggest that they typically overestimated the amounts of resources available to
them, average revenues under fragmented and absolutist regimes should appear larger
than otherwise. Furthermore, government accounting practices typically improved over
time, reducing the number and magnitude of misestimates. These features bias the data
against the hypothesis that political transformations led to greater tax incomes.19 By
the nineteenth century, national governments had typically developed modern fiscal ad-
ministrations, or were in the process of doing so. The 1816-1913 data on non-military
expenditures should therefore be reliable overall.
To make revenue and expenditure calculations comparable across countries, all cur-
rency units were transformed into gold grams. This conversion reduces potential infla-
tionary effects. The years between missing revenue observations were linearly interpo-
lated. Population figures were also linearly interpolated between census years. Since
there were few major one-off fiscal changes (i.e., besides the political transformations
that we focus on) or population shocks (e.g., plague) from 1650 to 1913, the interpo-
lated data should provide reasonable estimates. However, as the linkages between tax
bases and government spending were weaker than those for revenues, particularly dur-
ing wars, we did not interpolate the years between missing expenditure observations. To
18According to O’Brien (2011, pp. 415-16), the role of colonial revenues in the development of modern fiscal
systems was negligible. He argues that, after accounting for conquest costs and annual outlays for defense and
governance, net flows of colonial tributes into state coffers were typically small or negative. However, colonial
goods generally faced customs taxes at home ports. Our data include tax amounts from these sources.
19If Old Regime governments made payments in kind to fund public services like infrastructure, then it
is possible that no official record of these expenditures would exist. Conceivably the economic impacts of
these public services, however, would still be had. This feature would thus reduce the difference in average
performance between fragmented and absolutist regimes and other regime types.
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smooth short-run fluctuations and mitigate measurement errors, we averaged the data
over five-year periods (e.g., Beck and Levine, 2004).
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 summarizes the relationships between political regimes and economic perfor-
mance from 1650 to 1913. Our performance measure is percentage growth in real log per
capita GDP from Maddison (2010).20 Average per capita GDP growth rates per five-year
period for fragmented and limited (1.75), centralized and absolutist (3.11), and central-
ized and limited (4.88) regimes were high relative to those for fragmented and absolutist
ones (0.97).
We argue that a key reason why economic outcomes were better under centralized
and limited regimes was because states were able to both extract large tax funds and
productively use them. Table 5 describes the relationships between political regimes and
extractive capacity in terms of per capita revenues from 1650 to 1913. Average per capita
revenues in gold grams per five-year period for fragmented and limited (10.33), central-
ized and absolutist (6.78), and centralized and limited (12.90) regimes were high rela-
tive to those for fragmented and absolutist ones (2.41). Similarly, Table 6 describes the
relationships between political regimes and productive capacity in terms of per capita
non-military spending from 1816 to 1913. Average per capita non-military expenditures
in gold grams five-year period for fragmented and limited (6.23), centralized and abso-
lutist (6.76), and centralized and limited (11.41) regimes were also high relative to those
for fragmented and absolutist ones (1.35).
Table 7 summarizes the 1816-1913 spending data that are disaggregated beyond non-
military expenditures. These data are only available for a subset of six sample countries.
Furthermore, there are no observations for fragmented and absolutist regimes. Although
these limitations prevent us from subjecting the disaggregated spending data to econo-
metric analysis, it is still useful to examine the descriptive statistics. Recall from Section
3 that welfare spending by nineteenth-century states was typically low. We focus on two
non-military public services that central governments typically provided: infrastructure
and education. Average per capita infrastructure and education spending five-year pe-
riod for centralized and limited regimes (1.02 and 0.81 gold grams, respectively) was high
relative to other regime types. The case study of France in the next subsection further ex-
20Although GDP data from Barro and Ursu´a (2010) are a potential performance alternative, they are not
widely available prior to the 1850s. However, trends in the existing Barro-Ursu´a GDP data across political
regimes resemble those for the Maddison data.
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amines how disaggregated non-military expenditures varied over political regimes.21
4.2 Case Study of France
The overall trends in Tables 3 to 7 are consistent with our argument that political trans-
formations improved economic performance through greater state capacity. These pat-
terns also hold for individual countries. To further illustrate the linkages between polit-
ical regimes and fiscal and economic outcomes, we now examine France, a core sample
country for which long data series over various regime types are available.22
Figure 1 plots French national government revenues from 1650 to 1913. Revenues
were low, averaging just more than 3 gold grams per capita, under the fragmented and
absolutist regime that lasted through 1789. There was a sharp increase in revenues,
which roughly doubled to 10 gold grams per head, in the two decades after fiscal cen-
tralization in 1790. Revenues leveled out, but never fell back to pre-1789 levels, in the
decades just after the Napoleonic era.23 In the 1840s, they began to increase once more,
reaching 18 gold grams per capita by the end of the 1860s. The establishment of a stable
centralized and limited regime took place in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War
(1870-1). This set of events was associated with another jump in revenues, which more
than doubled to nearly 40 gold grams per head by 1913.24
How about expenditures? Figure 2 plots spending on infrastructure and education by
the French national government from 1816 to 1913. Infrastructure and education expen-
ditures under the centralized and absolutist regime were low, averaging less than 0.43
gold grams per capita, through the late 1820s. However, this spending nearly doubled
to 0.82 gold grams per head under the short-lived centralized and limited July regime
(1830-48).25 Napoleon III established authoritarian rule in 1851. During his reign, he
fought five wars.26 Although there was an uptick in infrastructure and education spend-
21Although primary school enrollment rates are a potential non-fiscal alternative, enrollment data from
Clemens and Williamson (2004), the most comprehensive historical database that we know of, are not available
prior to the 1860s. Nevertheless, the existing data indicate that enrollment rates under centralized and limited
regimes were high relative to other regime types.
22Our account follows Dincecco (2011, chs. 3-5 and 8), who also provides sources.
23Furthermore, France never again defaulted on its public debt over the nineteenth century, although it had
done so five times from 1650 to 1789.
24Per capita revenues in gold grams increased by more than 33 times from 1650 to 1913, while per capita
GDP increased by less than four times, indicating that state capacity improvements in France were not simply
the result of economic development. Nonetheless, our econometric analysis controls for this factor.
25The vertical lines demarcating this regime in Figures 3 and 4 are dashed to indicate that it was not counted
as limited under our benchmark coding scheme. Also see Section 2.
26These were the Crimean War (1853-6), Franco-Austrian War (1859), Second Italian War of Independence
17
ing at the start of the 1860s, it was relatively flat, averaging just 1.00 gold gram per capita.
With the establishment of a stable centralized and limited regime in 1870-1, there was a
rapid jump in infrastructure and education expenditures, which doubled to more than
2 gold grams per head by the start of the 1880s. Infrastructure and education spending
continued to increase through 1913, reaching 3.54 gold grams per capita.
To complete this picture, Figure 3 plots the share of infrastructure and education ex-
penditures in total expenditures for the French national government over the same pe-
riod. This share jumped from 5 to 8 percent under the centralized and limited July regime
from 1830 to 1848. Under the authoritarianism of Napoleon III, however, it fell to 5 per-
cent during the late 1850s and again with the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1). Under the
centralized and limited regime established in 1870-1, the share of infrastructure and edu-
cation spending reversed course, reaching 8 percent by the start of the 1880s. This share
continued to rise, although at a slower rate, through 1913.
Like the descriptive statistics, the case-study evidence for France supports our ar-
gument regarding the state capacity benefits of political transformations. Both tax cen-
tralization and limited government were associated with greater revenues, and limited
government with greater non-military expenditures. Finally, average per capita GDP
growth rates per five-year period in France increased from 0.75 under the fragmented
and absolutist regime to 3.67 under the centralized and absolutist one, and to 5.94 under
the centralized and limited one (Table 4).
4.3 Structural Breaks Tests
To complete this section, we now perform structural breaks tests, which assume no a
priori knowledge of major turning points in the fiscal time series. If these tests indicate
that political transformations coincided with structural breaks, then we will have fur-
ther motivating evidence that the transformations were associated with state capacity
improvements. For each sample country, we estimate multiple structural breaks in the
fiscal series following Bai and Perron (2003). Our linear regression models include ei-
ther a constant or a constant and a country-specific trend as regressors, with all of the
coefficients subject to shifts.27 To determine the number of breaks, we use the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC).
Table 8 reports the 95 percent confidence intervals for the structural break dates.
(1859-61), Battle of Mentana (1867), and Franco-Prussian War (1870-1).
27Both specifications delivered similar results. Varying the trimming parameters did not substantively alter
the results, either. Further modeling details are available upon request.
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Panel A displays the results for log per capita revenues from 1650 to 1913, and Panel B
the results for log per capita non-military expenditures from 1816 to 1913.28 Our analysis
indicates that the structural break confidence intervals encompass the dates of political
transformations for the vast majority of sample cases. Given that we use five-year aver-
ages, which smooth data fluctuations over time, these results are even more striking. In
Panel A for France, for instance, the confidence interval ranging from 1765 to 1790 en-
compassed fiscal centralization (1790), while the 1860-1870 interval encompassed limited
government (1870). In other cases, the dates of political transformations fell just outside
of the 95 percent confidence intervals (e.g., limited government in Piedmont in 1848 in
Panel B).
Overall, the descriptive statistics, the case study of France, and the structural breaks
tests highlight the fiscal and economic impacts of political transformations. To control
for the impacts of observable and unobservable factors beyond political regimes, we
now perform a full-fledged econometric analysis.
5 Econometric Methodology
We base our benchmark econometric model on the theoretical framework in Section 3,
where (1) political regime type affects state extractive and productive capabilities and
(2) state capacity in turn affects economic performance. We express this model as the
following set of two equations:
log Fit = α0 + α1CAit−1 + α2FLit−1 + α3CLit−1 + α4′Xit−1 + µi + λt + eit, (1)
and
∆Yit = β0 + β1 log Fit−1 + β2′Xit−1 + µi + λt + νit, (2)
where i = 1, . . . , N denotes countries, t = 1, . . . , T denotes time, Fit denotes the extractive
and productive capacity measures as per capita revenues and non-military expenditures,
respectively, ∆Yit denotes economic performance as growth in real log per capita GDP,
CAit−1, FLit−1, and CLit−1 are lagged political regime indicators, Xit−1 is a lagged vector
of controls, µi and λt are country and time fixed effects, and eit is the error term. We lag
28For this analysis and the subsequent one described in Section 5, we express the state capacity (and perfor-
mance) measures in natural logarithms, which attenuates the variability in per capita values and facilitates the
interpretation of our results. We did not perform the structural breaks tests for Belgium in either panel, because
the fiscal data start after both political transformations took place there. Similarly, in Panel B we did not per-
form the structural breaks tests for England, because the 1816-1913 fiscal data start after both transformations
took place there, or for Prussia, due to too few data observations.
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the independent variables, both to reduce the likelihood of simultaneity (Jones, 1995),
and because our historical narrative in Section 2 suggests that political transformations,
which often took place in chaotic environments, likely required a grace period for full
implementation.29 We use clustered standard errors to account for within-country corre-
lations.
The key independent variables in Equation 1 are the lagged political regime indica-
tors CAit−1, FLit−1, and CLit−1, which take the value 1 for each sample year that a coun-
try had a centralized and absolutist (fragmented and limited, centralized and limited)
regime and 0 otherwise, with the fragmented and absolutist regime FAit−1 as the bench-
mark. These dummies represent a clear, concise, and intuitive way to measure the fiscal
impacts of political institutions. Recall from Section 2 that our coding of regimes biases
the data against the hypothesis that political transformations improved state capacity.30
The vector Xit−1 comprises a set of controls. Military spending was by far the largest
component of national budgets through the nineteenth century (Hoffman and Rosen-
thal, 1997). Furthermore, Aghion et al. (2012) argue that military rivalry was an impor-
tant factor in the historical rise of mass education. To account the impacts of warfare,
we include a dummy variable for each year of external conflicts in Europe according to
Dincecco (2011). To control for the fiscal impact of internal conflicts, which disrupted tax
and spending flows, we include a dummy variable for each year of civil war, coup, or
revolution, also from Dincecco (2011). Acemoglu et al. (2005a) argue that Atlantic trade
was key to Europe’s early economic success. They use time-invariant characteristics to
measure trade potential, which our country fixed effects capture.31 Comin et al. (2010)
argue that “old” technology affects long-run development. Our country fixed effects
capture their measure of technology adoption in 1500. From 1750 onward, England was
the global technological leader. Our country fixed effects also capture country-level dif-
ferences in geographical distances to the English border (i.e., the technological frontier).
Bockstette et al. (2002) and Putterman and Weil (2010) argue that a long history of state-
hood positively influences long-term growth. To control for state antiquity, we include
the measure from Putterman (2007).32 Early technology and state antiquity help to cap-
29We selected the optimal lag length based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978).
30As an alternative, we used an ordered specification that coded political regimes from least to most effective
according to Table 3. The results indicated that there were notable state capacity differences between political
regimes.
31These are whether the country was an Atlantic trader (England, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and
Spain), or the Atlantic coastline-to-area ratio. They also account for the aggregate volume of Atlantic trade,
which our time fixed effects capture.
32We rescaled this variable, called aosnew, to take values from 0 to 1, where 1 represents a “modern” nation-
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ture the impact of human capital accumulation, which Glaeser et al. (2004) argue is an
important source of long-run development.
While the previous set of controls applies to Equations 1 and 2 alike, two additional
controls are specific to Equation 1. First, since countries at different development stages
could have chosen different state capacity levels (e.g., Glaeser et al., 2004), we control
for lagged per capita GDP. We also restrict the analysis to the pre-industrial period as a
robustness check. Second, our theoretical framework indicates that extractive capacity
levels affected productive capacity. We thus control for lagged per capita revenues in the
specifications with non-military expenditures as the dependent variable.
Our difference-in-differences approach estimates the impacts of political regimes on
state capacity, and of state capacity on economic performance. We also control for time-
varying factors and include country-specific time trends. However, the model assump-
tions can still be violated in a manner that generates correlations between our variables
of interest and the error term and biases our results.
One concern is reverse causation. In Equation 1, for instance, it is possible that state
capacity improvements preceded political transformations, and that continued improve-
ments after transformations reflected underlying capacity trends rather than the impacts
of the transformations themselves. However, the historical evidence described in Sec-
tion 2 suggests that it is plausible to treat political transformations as the result of quasi-
random variation or shocks. We also perform placebo tests for which we recode political
transformations as a robustness check.
A second concern is omitted variables. For instance, it is likely that the shocks that
generated political transformations, and the transformations themselves, had unobserved
time-varying, country-specific consequences beyond state capacity improvements that
also affected economic performance.33 Depending on whether the economic impacts of
these consequences were positive or negative, then our results would overestimate or
underestimate, respectively, the performance impacts of state capacity.
Since political transformations likely influenced economic performance through a
range of channels, we are skeptical of using them to instrument for capacity improve-
state.
33As described in Section 2, there were some cases of incomplete or failed institutional reform. By condi-
tioning on lasting political transformations, it could be that our estimates confound the performance impacts
of state capacity with the impacts of other factors that enabled the transformations to endure. At the same
time, however, this possibility also biases the data against our hypothesis, because it implies that the “weak-
est” reforms and regimes disappeared from our sample. If only the “strongest” fragmented and absolutist
regimes survived, then the results of our analysis will be more robust than otherwise if they still indicate that
centralized and limited regimes had significant positive state capacity impacts.
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ments. However, we are still able to address omitted variable bias in several ways. Be-
yond our set of time-variant controls and fixed effects, we include country-specific time
trends to account for unobservable factors that changed smoothly but differently across
countries. We also test two alternative models to difference-in-differences. The first adds
a lagged dependent variable to control for persistent performance impacts. Since OLS
estimates are biased in models with lagged dependent variables and country fixed ef-
fects, however, we must exclude the fixed effects. The second uses GMM (Blundell and
Bond, 1998), enabling us to include country fixed effects while concomitantly accounting
for potential simultaneity bias and the (weak) endogeneity of the regressors through the
use of internal instruments.34 We present results based on the difference GMM estimator,
which instruments for the lagged dependent variable with differenced past values.35 We
complement the difference specification with forward orthogonal deviations (Arellano
and Bover, 1995), which improves estimation efficiency given the unbalanced nature of
our panel, and allows us to account for the potential “weak instruments” problem when
outcomes are persistent.36 GMM estimation is based on the assumption that the error
terms are uncorrelated, and, for the case of forward orthogonal deviations, that changes
in the instrumenting variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects. While we recog-
nize that these assumptions are strong, Hansen tests of overidentification restrictions and
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests indicate that our sample satisfies them.
6 Impacts of Political Regimes on State Capacity
6.1 Extractive Capacity
Table 9 presents the results of our estimations for the impacts of political regimes on ex-
tractive capacity in terms of per capita revenues from 1650 to 1913 according to Equation
1. Column (1) reports the results for the parsimonious difference-in-differences specifi-
cation. Political transformations had significant positive impacts on extractive capacity.
The move from the fragmented and absolutist regime to the fragmented and limited one
increased per capita revenues by 84 percent over the subsequent five-year period, the
34Although our main GMM specification allows for contemporaneous independent variables, the results are
similar if we lag the independent variables as for OLS.
35As is standard, we use all of the differenced past values as instruments (MaCurdy, 2007). The large T in
our panel, however, may give rise to the “many instruments” problem. For robustness, we severely restricted
the number of instruments to two to five lags. The results were similar. Instrumenting for the key independent
variable with differenced past values did not significantly alter the results either.
36The results remain similar if first differences rather than forward orthogonal deviations are used.
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move to the centralized and absolutist one by 26 percent, and the move to the central-
ized and limited one by 48 percent.
Column (2) adds the time-varying controls. The impacts of political transformations
on per capita revenues are similar in magnitude and significance as before. Now the
revenue impact of the move to the centralized and absolutist regime increases to 35 per-
cent. While external conflicts had a positive and sometimes significant revenue impact,
internal conflicts typically had a negative but negligible impact. The revenue impact of
state antiquity was typically positive but negligible.
Column (3) adds country-specific time trends. The results for the moves to the cen-
tralized and absolutist regime and the centralized and limited one resemble the previous
ones. While the move to the fragmented and limited regime remains positive, it is no
longer significant. However, its significance is restored in the specifications that follow.
Many political transformations, and in particular the establishment of limited gov-
ernment, took place from 1848 onward (Tables 1 and 2). Furthermore, the Industrial Rev-
olution took place in continental Europe from 1870 to 1913 (Mokyr, 1998). As a robust-
ness check, Column (4) restricts the data to the pre-1848 period. The impacts of political
transformations on per capita revenues are all significant. Furthermore, the magnitudes
of the moves to the centralized and absolutist regime and the centralized and limited one
greatly increase in magnitude. Now the move to the centralized and absolutist regime
increased per capita revenues by 54 percent, and the move to the centralized and limited
one by 132 percent.
Finally, Column (5) reports the results for the alternative model that adds a lagged
dependent variable. The revenue impacts of political transformations are again all sig-
nificant. Under standard assumptions, we can view the coefficient magnitudes of our
key independent variables in this specification as lower bound estimates (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009). These magnitudes remain substantial. Now political transformations are
associated with a 17 to 29 percent increase in per capita revenues.37
6.2 Productive Capacity
Table 10 reports the sister results for the impacts of political regimes on productive capac-
ity in terms of per capita non-military expenditures from 1816 to 1913. Columns (1) to (4)
repeat the Table 9 specifications except for the pre-1848 period specification, which is not
feasible due to the lack of pre-nineteenth century non-military spending data. Political
37As a further sensitivity test, we excluded sample countries one at a time for our main specifications in
Sections 6 and 7. The substantive conclusions did not change.
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transformations had positive and generally significant impacts on productive capacity.
The move from the fragmented and absolutist regime to the fragmented and limited one
increased per capita non-military expenditures by 11 to 35 percent over the subsequent
five-year period, the move to the centralized and absolutist one by 22 to 58 percent, and
the move to the centralized and limited one by 20 to 83 percent. The move to the frag-
mented and limited regime is not significant in Columns (1) and (4). However, since
there are just 10 observations over two countries for this regime type, we can only ob-
tain very imprecise estimates of this parameter. In line with the theoretical predictions,
the signs of the conflict variables switch from the previous set of results for per capita
revenues. External conflicts had a negative non-military spending impact, while internal
conflicts typically had a positive impact. However, the significance of both impacts was
negligible. The non-military spending impact of state antiquity was typically positive
but negligible.
For robustness, Table 11 presents the results for the impacts of political regimes on
non-productive capacity in terms of per capita military expenditures. In stark contrast
with the set of results for non-military spending, the impacts of political transformations
on military spending were always negligible. Furthermore, the majority of regime co-
efficients were negative. This comparison provides further support for the claim that
political transformations had substantial impacts on government spending habits.
In sum, the results described in these two subsections indicate that political transfor-
mations had significant positive impacts on state extractive and productive capabilities.
These results are robust across a wide variety of specifications, controls, samples, and
modeling techniques.
6.3 Placebo Tests
Table 12 reports the results of placebo tests that address the possibility that state ca-
pacity differences across political regime types were the result of underlying capacity
trends that preceded political transformations, and not the impacts of the transforma-
tions themselves. In the spirit of Bertrand et al. (2004) and Stasavage (2012), we recode
political transformations as if they had taken place decades prior to the actual years,
and then reestimate our difference-in-differences specifications with time-varying con-
trols and country-specific time trends. If the coefficient estimates for the recoded placebo
political regime variables are similar in magnitude and significance to those described
in the previous two subsections, then our claim that political transformations had sig-
nificant positive capacity impacts will be cast into doubt. Parameter values that differ
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greatly from the previous sets of estimates, by contrast, will lend further credence to our
results.
Columns (1) to (4) display the estimates of the impacts of the placebo political regimes
on extractive capacity in terms of per capita revenues. Column (1) recodes fiscal central-
ization and limited government 15 years prior to the actual years, while Columns (2) to
(4) increase the placebos to 25, 35, and 50 years prior, respectively. The results are strik-
ing. Placebo political transformations never have a positive and significant impact on
per capita revenues. Indeed, all regime coefficients except for one are now negative. The
impact of the placebos for the move to the centralized and absolutist regime are always
negative and significant, as are the 50-year placebos for all regime types.
Columns (5) to (7) repeat this exercise for the impacts of the placebo political regimes
on productive capacity in terms of per capita non-military expenditures for the 15-, 25-
, and 35-year placebos, respectively (the 50-year placebo is not feasible due to the lack
of non-military expenditure data prior to 1815). The results are again striking. With
one exception, placebo political transformations never have a significant impact on per
capita non-military expenditures. The exception is the 15-year placebo for the move to
the centralized and limited regime. However, this impact becomes negative for the 25-
and 35-year placebos. The impacts of the 25- and 35-year placebos for the move to the
centralized and absolutist regime and the 35-year placebo for the move to the fragmented
and limited one are also negative.
Overall, the results of the placebo tests indicate that political transformations were
associated with abrupt improvements in state capacity that were not already underway.
Given that these transformations likely required a grace period to fully take hold, the
short temporal gaps between the actual years of political transformations and their place-
bos imply that our test criteria are quite strict.38 Thus, while the placebo results do not
allow us to completely exclude the possibility of reverse causation, they markedly en-
hance our argument that political transformations had significant positive impacts on
state capacity.39
38For instance, the tests in Stasavage (2012) recode the placebo dates of political change (in his case, the
establishment of political autonomy in medieval Europe) 100 years prior to the actual dates.
39As another robustness check, we tested a series of panel probit models for each of the political regime
indicators regressed on lagged per capita revenues and non-military expenditures, as well as on the remaining
predictor variables included in Xit−1. The coefficients for the extractive and productive capacity measures
were never significant, further addressing concerns about reverse causality bias.
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7 Impacts of State Capacity on Performance
Table 13 presents the results of our estimations for the impacts of state capacity on eco-
nomic performance in terms of per capita GDP growth according to Equation 2. Columns
(1) to (4) display the estimates of the performance impacts of extractive capacity in terms
of per capita revenues. The first three columns reports the results for the difference-in-
differences specifications. Improvements in extractive capacity had significant positive
impacts on economic performance. A 1 percent increase in per capita revenues led to a
0.384 to 0.833 percentage point increase in the growth rate of per capita GDP over the
subsequent five-year period. Given that average growth was 3 percent per five-year pe-
riod from 1650 to 1913, this impact is substantial.40
Column (4) reports the results for the lagged dependent variable model. While the
performance impact of greater extractive capacity remains positive, it is no longer sig-
nificant. However, the GMM equivalent of this specification (to be described ahead),
which includes both the lagged dependent variable and country fixed effects, restores
the positive and significant impact.
Columns (5) to (7) display the sister estimates of the performance impacts of pro-
ductive capacity in terms of per capita non-military expenditures for the difference-in-
differences specifications. Productive capacity improvements typically had significant
positive impacts on economic performance. The specifications in Columns (5) and (6)
indicate that a 1 percent increase in per capita non-military expenditures led to a 1.261 to
3.272 percentage point increase in the growth rate of per capita GDP over the subsequent
five-year period. Since average growth was 5 percent per five-year period from 1816 to
1913, this impact is large.41
In the specification with country-specific time trends in Column (7), the performance
impact of greater productive capacity is negligible (the sign turns negative). However,
this impact is positive and significant in the GMM equivalent of this specification to be
described ahead. Furthermore, Column (8) repeats this specification with an alternative
productive capacity measure, the share of non-military expenditures in total expendi-
tures. The non-military spending share had a positive and significant performance im-
40An alternative interpretation is as follows. Since the move from the fragmented and absolutist regime to
the centralized and limited one led to a roughly 40 percent average per capita revenue increase, our estimates
would imply that, holding all else constant, the establishment of an effective state led to a 15 to 33 percentage
point increase in the subsequent growth rate of per capita GDP.
41Alternatively, given that the move to the centralized and limited regime led to a roughly 40 percent average
per capita non-military spending increase, our estimates would imply that, ceteris paribus, the establishment
of an effective state led to a 50 to 131 percentage point increase in the subsequent growth rate of per capita
GDP.
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pact: a 1 percent increase in this share led to a 0.109 percentage point increase in the
growth rate of per capita GDP over the subsequent five-year period. For further com-
parison, Column (9) substitutes per capita military for non-military expenditures and
repeats the Column (7) specification. As our theoretical framework predicts, this substi-
tution delivers a far worse result. The performance impact of greater military spending
is negative and significant: a 1 percent increase in per capita military spending led to a
4.687 percentage point decrease in the growth rate of per capita GDP over the subsequent
five-year period. Finally, Column (10) reports the results for the lagged dependent vari-
able model. Per capita non-military expenditures again have a positive and significant
growth impact.
For robustness, Table 14 presents the results for the performance impacts of state ca-
pacity for the GMM model. State capacity improvements had significant positive growth
impacts in all specifications except for one. The exception is the specification for extrac-
tive capacity in terms of per capita revenues with country-specific time trends in Col-
umn (3). While the coefficient on per capita revenues remains positive, it is no longer
significant. However, recall that the OLS equivalent of this specification as described
previously delivered the positive and significant impact. The specification for produc-
tive capacity in terms of per capita non-military expenditures with country-specific time
trends in Column (6) is now significant and large: a 1 percent increase in per capita non-
military spending led to a 3.272 percentage point increase in the growth rate of per capita
GDP per five-year period. The performance impact of the non-military spending share
in Column (7) remains significant and doubles in magnitude from OLS. Finally, while the
performance impact of greater per capita military spending in Column (8) is no longer
significantly negative as it was for OLS, it (in contrast to non-military spending) is still
not significantly positive.
Summarizing, the results described in this section indicate that improvements in state
extractive and productive capabilities had significant positive impacts on economic per-
formance. These impacts are robust to a broad range of specifications, controls, and
modeling techniques.
8 Conclusion
This paper presents new evidence about the long-term links between state capacity and
economic development. We focus on Europe, the birthplace of modern economic growth.
Sovereign governments in European history were typically fiscally fragmented and abso-
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lutist. We argue that the establishment of states with modern extractive and productive
capabilities had strongly positive performance impacts.
To rigorously develop our claim, we perform a panel regression analysis on a novel
database that spans eleven countries and four centuries. Our approach accounts for po-
tential biases induced by simultaneity, omitted variables, and unobserved heterogeneity.
Placebo tests allow us to further assess the validity of our findings. The results indicate
that the performance impacts of state capacity improvements are significant, large, and
robust.
To the best of our knowledge, our results are among the first to provide rigorous
proof that state capacity plays a key role in long-run economic development. While we
believe that this paper takes an important step, there is still ample room for future empir-
ical work. Our macro-oriented approach focuses on big-picture concerns. One valuable
extension would be to use quasi-natural or randomized controlled micro-level exper-
iments that pinpoint the finer causal impacts of specific state capacity-oriented policy
interventions.
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Data Appendix
Data for per capita tax revenues from 1650 to 1913 are from Dincecco (2011, appendices A.1, A.2,
A.3). See Section 4 for further details.
Data sources for military, infrastructure, and education expenditures per capita are listed
ahead. Disaggregated expenditure data in home currencies were converted into gold grams fol-
lowing the methodology in Dincecco (2011, appendix A.2). Data for total expenditures and popu-
lation are from Dincecco (2011, appendices A.1, A.2) unless otherwise stated. These data use total
spending by national governments including debt service and incorporate loan amounts when
given. Non-military expenditures per head were computed as per capita total expenditures mi-
nus per capita military expenditures.
Austria. Military spending data are from Pammer (2010, Figure 5.1). Infrastructure and education
expenditure data are not available.
Belgium. Military spending data are from Singer (1987). They were downloaded from the Corre-
lates of War website as the National Military Capabilities Dataset, Version 4.0. Infrastructure and
education expenditure data are not available.
Denmark. Military spending data are from Singer (1987). They were downloaded from the Cor-
relates of War website as the National Military Capabilities Dataset, Version 4.0. Infrastructure
and education expenditure data are not available.
England. Military, infrastructure, and education spending data are from Mitchell (1988, public
finance table 4). To compute military expenditures, spending for the Army and Ordnance and
for the Navy were summed. Infrastructure expenditures uses the spending category for Works
and Buildings, and education expenditures the category for Education, Art, and Science.
France. Military, infrastructure, and education spending data are from Fontvieille (1976, Tables
CVXI-XXXV). Infrastructure expenditures uses the spending category for Public Works.
Netherlands. Military spending data are from van Zanden (1996, table 4) for 1816-41. Van Zan-
den provides data averages for 1816-20, 1821-4, 1825-9, 1831-4, 1835-9, and 1841-50. The average
for 1816-20 was used for 1816, the average for 1821-4 for 1821, and so on. The military spending
shares closely match those from van Zanden and van Riel (2010, table 2.1). Total expenditure data
from this source were used in combination with the information on shares to back out military
expenditures. For 1816-30 we divided these figures by the expenditure share for the Southern
Netherlands (i.e., Belgium, Luxembourg, and their hinterlands) according to van Zanden (1996,
table 5) to derive military expenditures for the (Northern) Netherlands, as data for total expen-
ditures from Dincecco (2011) exclude the Southern Netherlands. The source for the 1816-41 data
does not distinguish between infrastructure and education spending. Rather, both are included
under the expenditure category for Home Affairs. Military, infrastructure, and education spend-
ing data are from van Zanden and van Riel (2010, table 2.3) for 1850-1913. They provide data
shares at 10-year intervals for 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1900, and 1913. Total expenditure data
from this source were used in combination with the information on shares to back out military
expenditures.
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Piedmont. Military spending data are from Dincecco et al. (2011) for 1830-59, the Ufficio Storico
(1980, pp. 508-9) for 1861-9, and Hobson (1993) for 1870-1913. Infrastructure and education ex-
penditures are from Felloni (1959) for 1830-59 and Brosio and Marchese (1986, table 4a) for 1861-
1913. Infrastructure spending for 1861-1913 uses the expenditure category for Public Works.
Portugal. Military, infrastructure, and education spending data are from Silveira (1987, table 8)
for 1816-27, Mata and Vale´rio (2001, table 1) for 1832-45, and Mata (1993, table 1) for 1851-1913. To
compute military expenditures, spending by the Ministerio da Guerra (after 1827; Exercito before-
hand) and the Ministerio da Marihna were summed. Infrastructure expenditures uses spending
by the Ministe´rio das Obras Pu´blicas. There was no education ministry over this period. Educa-
tion expenditures thus uses the category for the education burden (i.e., Encargos cum Instruc¸o˜es).
Since the total military spending calculation matches well with the Encargos cum Difesa category
(and perfectly from 1884 onward), we are confident that the same holds for education.
Prussia. The German Reich (1871-1945) was a federal system and a great deal of taxing and
spending was done at the state (e.g., Prussian) level. The federal government was responsible
for military expenditures and welfare (Ziblatt, 2006). Spoerer (2010, table 4.1) provides Prussian
military and welfare expenditures for 1847 and 1867. After unification there are only Reich data
available for these categories. These data were not used because there was no clear way of in-
tegrating the pre-1871 Prussian series with the post-1870 Reich one. Spoerer’s data for Prussia
were supplemented with 1820 data for military defense from Ziblatt (2006, table 3.1). Here total
Prussian expenditures from 1821 were used due to data availability.
Spain. Military spending data are from Carreras and Tafunell (2006), table 12.8 for 1816-42 and ta-
ble 12.13 for 1845-1913. To compute military expenditures, spending by the Ministerio de Guerra
(through 1842; the Minsterio de Defensa from 1845 onward) and the Ministerio de Marina were
summed. The sources for the 1816-99 data do not distinguish between infrastructure and edu-
cation spending. Rather, both are included under the expenditure category for the Ministerio de
Estado through 1842 and the Ministerio de Fomento from 1845 onward. Disaggregated infras-
tructure and expenditure data for the Ministerio de Fomento are displayed for 1900-13. These
data indicate that infrastructure (Ministerio de Obras Pu´blicas) and education (Ministerio de Ed-
ucacio´n y Cienca) comprised all of the Minsterio de Fomento’s expenditures for these years.
Sweden. Military spending data are from Krantz and Scho¨n (2010, table XI). At the central govern-
ment level, there are no separate expenditure categories for infrastructure or education. Rather,
it is probable that both are included under the spending category for civil services. We thus use
this category as a proxy for these two types of expenditures.
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Table 1: Dates of Fiscal Centralization in Europe
Year Event
England 1066 Establishment of uniform rule after Norman Conquest
France 1790 Major administrative reforms during French Revolution
Belgium 1795 Major administrative reforms after French annexation
Piedmont 1802 Major administrative reforms after French annexation
Netherlands 1806 Major administrative reforms under French control
Prussia 1806 Major administrative reforms after French defeat in battle
Spain 1845 Major administrative reforms after Moderate Coup of 1843
Austria 1848 Major administrative reforms during Year of Revolutions
Portugal 1859 Major administrative reforms after Revolutionary Era
Sweden 1861 Abolition of pre-modern tax system
Denmark 1903 Abolition of pre-modern tax system
Source: Dincecco (2011).
Note: See text for definition of fiscal centralization.
36
Table 2: Dates of Limited Government in Europe
Year Event
Netherlands 1572 Establishment of Dutch Republic (1572-1795) after revolt from Spain
1848 Implementation of new constitution during Year of Revolutions
England 1688 Establishment of constitutional monarchy during Glorious Revolution
Belgium 1831 Founded as constitutional monarchy after Revolution of 1830
Piedmont 1848 Establishment of constitutional monarchy during Year of Revolutions
Prussia 1848 Establishment of constitutional monarchy during Year of Revolutions
Denmark 1848 Establishment of constitutional monarchy during Year of Revolutions
Portugal 1851 Establishment of constitutional monarchy after Revolutionary Era
Sweden 1866 Introduction of bicameral legislature
Austria 1867 Establishment of constitutional monarchy after defeat by Prussia
France 1870 Formation of constitutional regime during war with Prussia
Spain 1876 Establishment of constitutional monarchy after civil war
Source: Dincecco (2011).
Note: See text for definition of limited government.
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Table 3: Fiscal and Economic Characteristics of Political Regimes
Regime Type Extractive Capacity Productive Capacity Performance
Fragmented and Absolutist Low Low Low
Centralized and Absolutist High Low Low
Fragmented and Limited Low High Increases
Centralized and Limited High High High
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Table 4: Per Capita GDP Growth Rates, 1650-1913
All Regimes FA FL CA CL
All countries Obs 341 121 26 55 136
Mean 2.97 0.97 1.75 3.11 4.88
Austria Obs 18 6 3 9
Mean 5.55 4.72 3.64 6.75
Belgium Obs 15 15
Mean 7.03 7.03
Denmark Obs 9 8 1
Mean 7.74 7.14 12.55
England Obs 51 7 44
Mean 2.78 1.18 3.03
France Obs 51 27 16 8
Mean 2.48 0.75 3.67 5.94
Netherlands Obs 37 16 9 12
Mean 1.58 -0.60 2.01 4.17
Piedmont Obs 16 4 12
Mean 4.17 3.11 4.53
Portugal Obs 28 16 2 10
Mean 1.22 0.32 -0.90 3.07
Prussia Obs 44 23 9 12
Mean 2.96 0.70 3.28 7.04
Spain Obs 41 28 6 7
Mean 1.97 0.77 4.72 4.44
Sweden Obs 31 21 1 9
Mean 3.20 1.26 4.65 7.55
Source: Maddison (2010).
Note: FA=Fragmented and Absolutist, CA=Centralized and Absolutist,
FL=Fragmented and Limited, CL=Centralized and Limited. Data are
percentage growth in real log per capita GDP per 5-year period.
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Table 5: Per Capita Revenues, 1650-1913
All Regimes FA FL CA CL
All countries Obs 352 127 28 57 140
Mean 7.92 2.41 10.33 6.78 12.90
Austria Obs 19 7 3 9
Mean 8.68 3.01 5.33 14.21
Belgium Obs 16 16
Mean 14.55 14.55
Denmark Obs 10 9 1
Mean 10.12 9.59 14.89
England Obs 52 8 44
Mean 11.93 2.67 13.61
France Obs 52 28 16 8
Mean 9.75 3.32 11.11 29.56
Netherlands Obs 38 17 9 12
Mean 12.24 11.82 10.21 13.81
Piedmont Obs 17 5 12
Mean 10.41 4.27 12.97
Portugal Obs 29 17 2 10
Mean 1.37 0.75 0.95 2.51
Prussia Obs 45 24 9 12
Mean 5.82 3.61 3.77 11.78
Spain Obs 42 29 6 7
Mean 1.65 0.99 2.42 3.71
Sweden Obs 32 22 1 9
Mean 4.67 2.89 3.47 9.11
Source: Dincecco (2011).
Note: FA=Fragmented and Absolutist, CA=Centralized and Absolutist,
FL=Fragmented and Limited, CL=Centralized and Limited. Data are
expressed in gold grams and use 5-year averages.
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Table 6: Per Capita Non-Military Spending, 1816-1913
All Regimes FA FL CA CL
All countries Obs 166 26 10 31 99
Mean 8.65 1.35 6.23 6.76 11.41
Austria Obs 18 5 4 9
Mean 9.77 2.74 4.56 16.00
Belgium Obs 16 16
Mean 14.78 14.78
Denmark Obs 10 8 2
Mean 8.45 7.58 11.93
England Obs 19 19
Mean 12.15 12.15
France Obs 19 11 8
Mean 14.58 9.92 20.99
Netherlands Obs 10 4 6
Mean 12.92 13.00 12.89
Piedmont Obs 15 4 11
Mean 9.85 3.19 12.28
Portugal Obs 18 6 2 10
Mean 1.56 0.46 0.83 2.37
Prussia Obs 3 1 2
Mean 3.48 2.84 3.80
Spain Obs 19 6 6 7
Mean 1.85 0.71 1.88 2.81
Sweden Obs 19 9 1 9
Mean 4.25 1.61 3.34 6.98
Source: See Appendix.
Note: FA=Fragmented and Absolutist, CA=Centralized and Absolutist,
FL=Fragmented and Limited, CL=Centralized and Limited. Data are
expressed in gold grams and use 5-year averages.
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Table 7: Infrastructure and Education Spending, 1816-1913
Panel A: Per Capita Infrastructure Expenditures
All Regimes FA FL CA CL
All countries Obs 74 0 2 16 56
Mean 0.91 0.21 0.60 1.02
England Obs 19 19
Mean 0.23 0.23
France Obs 19 11 8
Mean 0.82 0.68 1.01
Netherlands Obs 6 6
Mean 1.57 1.57
Piedmont Obs 15 4 11
Mean 1.93 0.44 2.47
Portugal Obs 12 2 10
Mean 0.45 0.21 0.50
Prussia Obs 3 1 2
Mean 1.12 0.24 1.56
Panel B: Per Capita Education Expenditures
All Regimes FA FL CA CL
All countries Obs 74 0 2 16 56
Mean 0.64 0.04 0.11 0.81
England Obs 19 19
Mean 0.72 0.72
France Obs 19 11 8
Mean 0.61 0.11 1.30
Netherlands Obs 6 6
Mean 0.51 0.51
Piedmont Obs 15 4 11
Mean 0.80 0.06 1.07
Portugal Obs 12 2 10
Mean 0.08 0.04 0.09
Prussia Obs 3 1 2
Mean 1.88 0.32 2.66
Source: See Appendix.
Note: FA=Fragmented and Absolutist, CA=Centralized and Absolutist,
FL=Fragmented and Limited, CL=Centralized and Limited. Data are
expressed in gold grams and use 5-year averages.
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Table 8: Structural Breaks Tests
Panel A: Log Per Capita Revenues, 1650-1913
Break Dates Pol Transformation
(95% Conf Intervals) Dates
Austria 1835–1860 1848
1855–1865 1867
Denmark 1885–1900 1903
England 1680–1690 1688
France 1765–1790 1790
1860–1870 1870
Netherlands 1735–1810 1806
Piedmont 1845–1855 1848
Portugal 1845–1860 1851, 1859
Prussia 1840–1860 1848
Spain 1835–1860 1845
1865–1875 1876
Sweden 1855–1870 1861, 1866
Panel B: Log Per Cap Non-Mil Exps, 1816-1913
Break Dates Pol Transformation
(95% Conf Intervals) Dates
Austria 1831–1851 1848
1861–1891 1867
Denmark 1881–1896 1903
France 1861–1871 1870
Netherlands 1831–1856 1848
Piedmont 1836–1846 1848
Portugal 1841–1856 1851, 1859
Spain 1841–1861 1845
Sweden 1846–1866 1861, 1866
Note: Pure structural change models estimated by OLS following
Bai and Perron (2003). Number of breaks determined by BIC.
Data use 5-year averages.
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Table 9: Impacts of Political Regimes on Extractive Capacity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable is Log Per Capita Revenuet
Centralized and absolutist regimet−1 0.259 0.349 0.315 0.537 0.172
(0.146) (0.194) (0.067) (0.139) (0.035)
Fragmented and limited regimet−1 0.837 0.815 0.193 0.506 0.290
(0.261) (0.223) (0.158) (0.216) (0.056)
Centralized and limited regimet−1 0.481 0.498 0.559 1.321 0.184
(0.218) (0.267) (0.248) (0.350) (0.046)
Log per capita revenuet−1 0.792
(0.042)
Log per capita GDPt−1 0.389 0.780 2.526 -0.035
(0.454) (0.523) (0.931) (0.134)
External war dummyt−1 0.163 0.195 0.280 0.151
(0.124) (0.136) (0.139) (0.056)
Internal war dummyt−1 -0.044 -0.133 -0.193 0.092
(0.319) (0.303) (0.361) (0.084)
State antiquityt 0.977 1.541 -2.463 0.157
(0.564) (0.940) (2.325) (0.181)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific time trends No No Yes Yes Yes
Sample period 1650- 1650- 1650- 1650- 1650-
1913 1913 1913 1845 1913
R-squared 0.926 0.930 0.950 0.948 0.970
Observations 341 341 341 212 341
Number of countries 11 11 11 10 11
Note: Estimation method is OLS. Data use 5-year averages. Robust standard
errors clustered by country in parentheses.
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Table 10: Impacts of Political Regimes on Productive Capacity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable is Log Per Capita Non-Military Expendituret
Centralized and absolutist regimet−1 0.578 0.427 0.223 0.298
(0.203) (0.115) (0.115) (0.092)
Fragmented and limited regimet−1 0.349 0.285 0.221 0.110
(0.267) (0.151) (0.119) (0.114)
Centralized and limited regimet−1 0.827 0.414 0.267 0.198
(0.385) (0.182) (0.150) (0.084)
Log per capita revenuet−1 0.787 0.648 0.325
(0.151) (0.094) (0.100)
Log per cap non-military expendituret−1 0.531
(0.072)
Log per capita GDPt−1 -0.364 -0.823 0.429
(0.390) (0.480) (0.345)
External war dummyt−1 -0.138 -0.146 -0.137
(0.216) (0.230) (0.219)
Internal war dummyt−1 0.173 0.205 -0.035
(0.172) (0.139) (0.112)
State antiquityt 0.837 0.903 0.198
(0.433) (0.425) (0.313)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific time trends No No Yes Yes
Sample period 1816- 1816- 1816- 1816-
1913 1913 1913 1913
R-squared 0.951 0.974 0.982 0.972
Observations 144 144 144 144
Number of countries 10 10 10 10
Note: Estimation method is OLS. Data use 5-year averages. Robust standard
errors clustered by country in parentheses.
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Table 11: Impacts of Political Regimes on Non-Productive Capacity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable is Log Per Capita Military Expendituret
Centralized and absolutist regimet−1 -0.049 -0.117 0.163 0.108
(0.265) (0.245) (0.250) (0.103)
Fragmented and limited regimet−1 -0.455 -0.379 -0.361 -0.109
(0.289) (0.274) (0.115) (0.211)
Centralized and limited regimet−1 -0.014 0.069 0.065 -0.001
(0.272) (0.228) (0.151) (0.057)
Log per capita revenuet−1 0.230 0.223 0.312
(0.155) (0.227) (0.127)
Log per cap military expendituret−1 0.327
(0.080)
Log per capita GDPt−1 0.384 1.169 0.685
(0.406) (0.387) (0.368)
External war dummyt−1 0.120 0.122 0.036
(0.162) (0.169) (0.137)
Internal war dummyt−1 0.710 0.471 0.118
(0.075) (0.138) (0.111)
State antiquityt -0.736 0.023 -0.350
(0.585) (0.404) (0.319)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific time trends No No Yes Yes
Sample period 1816- 1816- 1816- 1816-
1913 1913 1913 1913
R-squared 0.929 0.944 0.965 0.961
Observations 144 144 144 144
Number of countries 10 10 10 10
Note: Estimation method is OLS. Data use 5-year averages. Robust standard
errors clustered by country in parentheses.
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Table 12: Placebo Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable is Log State Capacity Measure
Rev Rev Rev Rev Non-Mil Non-Mil Non-Mil
Exp Exp Exp
15 yrs 25 yrs 35 yrs 50 yrs 15 yrs 25 yrs 35 yrs
prior prior prior prior prior prior prior
Centralized and absolutist regime -0.293 -0.555 -0.549 -0.536 0.157 -0.078 -0.164
(placebo) (0.157) (0.198) (0.191) (0.180) (0.174) (0.267) (0.068)
Fragmented and limited regime -0.059 -0.138 -0.166 -0.454 0.255 0.476 -0.483
(placebo) (0.262) (0.264) (0.230) (0.163) (0.285) (0.309) (0.547)
Centralized and limited regime 0.099 -0.217 -0.253 -0.760 0.327 -0.068 -0.246
(placebo) (0.184) (0.198) (0.169) (0.369) (0.164) (0.271) (0.180)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample period 1650- 1650- 1650- 1650- 1816- 1816- 1816-
1913 1913 1913 1913 1913 1913 1913
R-squared 0.951 0.955 0.955 0.953 0.982 0.982 0.981
Observations 341 341 341 341 144 144 144
Number of countries 11 11 11 11 10 10 10
Note: Estimation method is OLS. Data use 5-year averages. Robust standard errors clustered by
country in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Per Capita Revenues, France, 1650-1913
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Source: Dincecco (2011).
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Figure 2: Per Capita Infrastructure and Education Spending, France, 1816-1913
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Figure 3: Infrastructure and Education Spending Share, France, 1816-1913
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Note: Figure displays share of infrastructure and education expenditures in total expenditures.
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